The ideal Bayesian agent reasons from a global probability model, but real agents are restricted to simpl ified models which they know to be adequate only in restricted circumstances. Very little formal theory has been developed to help fallibly rational agents manage the process of constructing and revising small world models.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the use of decision theory as a framework for analyzing the behavior of an intelligent autonomous agent. It is generally agreed that our best exemplars of intelligent autonomous agency--human beings--are not Bayesians. It is also generally agreed that many systematic departures from the Bayesian norm can be explained as heuristics which people use to cope with computational constraints. Given that any agent we can build will have limited computational capacity, what role should decision theory play for the enterprise of developing intelligent autonomous agents?
Bayesian decision theory justifies many qualitative features of generally accepted "good" reasoning, and explains many qualitative features of "bad" reasoning (see, � .g., Pearl, 1?88; Howsen and Urbach, 1989) . The theory IS often apphed in cases in which the idealized axioms are clearly unrealistic. But successful decision analysis usually requires a highly trained (human) decision analyst working with the decision maker to construct a model of the problem. Similarly, decision theoretic computer systems either are hand-crafted for constrained, well understood domains, or use heuristic methods at the meta level to construct an object-level decision theoretic model (e.g., Andreassen, et al., 1987; Goldman and Charniak, 1990) .
It has been argued that the latter is the appropriate role for decision theory (Wellman and Heckerman, 1987) . A heuristic meta-level reasoner constructs decision theoretic models for "small worlds," or restricted sets of propositions and actions. Decision theory enforces consistency on beliefs and action recommendations produced by the "small-world" models. The meta-level reasoner is free to use the output of a small world model, modify it, or change the model, depending on the situation.
But this approach begs two important questions. First, if formal justifications of decision theory assume "grand world" coherence, what justifies decision theory on the small world? Second, what theory underlies the meta-reasoner?
This paper is part of a research effort to develop a decision theoretically based foundation for the meta-reasoner. My basic formulation can be summarized as follows. The meta-reasoner controls a search process over a space of small world models. This search process is viewed as an approximation to a (computationally infeasible) decision theoretic model on some larger world. I assume that the agent would prefer the larger world model, if it could be computed, to the feasible small world approximation.
Within this formal framework, search processes over small worlds can be analyzed to determine how well they perform as approximations to the larger world model. Note that I do not assert that the larger world model represents the agent's "true" grand-world beliefs--indeed, I do not even assume that the agent has grand-world beliefs.
In this paper, I restrict attention to the common and important class of problems in which an agent forecasts probabilities of a sequence of events. These events may be repeated events of the same kind, as when an agent assesses probabilities for different diseases given patients' observed symptoms. Alternatively, the events may be of different kinds, as when a common sense reasoner makes predictions about events it expects in its current situation. In either case, I assume the agent receives feedback about whether the forecast events actually occur. The agent can search a countably infinite space of probability models, but has access to only two models (the current model and a comparison model) at any given time. Under given conditions on the agent's search process, I derive results about convergence of the agent's model to the larger world probabilities.
THE SEQUENTIAL FORECASTING PROBLEM
Consider an agent attempting to forecast the probabilities of a sequence E 1 , E2, ... of arbitrary events occurring sequentially in time. 1 The events can be defined in advance or defmed dynamically on the basis of information observed at times prior to time t. The agent's task is to state a probability Pt for Et. This forecast may take into account the agent's entire experience up to, but not including, the events which occur at time period t. Formally, let �t be a 0'-field representing all events known to the agent at times up to and including time period t. The agent's knowledge increases monotonically with time--that is, -% c Jii c ... The condition that the forecast must make use only of information known before time t is formally expressed by requiring that the agent's forecast Pt be an Jft.-1 measurable function. Thus,
where-% c Jil c...
(1)
expressing dependence of the agent's probability estimate for Et on the past history Jft.-1 of observations.
Denote the indicator function of Et by Xt:
The expression P ( X1 I 1ft-1) is !!Sed to denote P ( E 1 I .1f1_1) when Xt = 1 and P(E1 I 9-ft-1) when X1=0.
MODEL SEARCH AND REVISION

ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF THE MIXTURE MODE L
Consider a set of models indexed by a parameter ro e n. Each model represents a recipe for computing forecasts P ro<Et I Jft.-1) at each time period from information known to the agent prior to that time. The set n can represent either a space of implicitly defmed models which a single agent can enumerate, or a population of agents, each of whom has a recipe for predicting E1. This paper considers the probability forecasts of a single agent who has access to the models in 0., either because she is the agent enumerating and computing the implicitly defined models, or because she can ask the other agents in the population for their forecasts. However, the agent is assumed to have finite resources for computing or communicating, and cannot access all the models at once. The set n comprises all the models the agent is able to consider. For the present, let us assume that the agent believes 0 to be adequate. That is, the agent's larger world model is a probability mixture over the Pro. An agent would assign a probability mixture over the Pro if she believed one of the models to be correct, and expressed her uncertainty about which one was correct as a probability distribution over n. Note, however, that an agent might be willing to assign a mixture distribution over the n without believing in the literal truth of any of the P00• Note also that the agent may not be able to compute this mixture distribution--but she believes that if she could compute it, the mixture would provide accurate probability forecasts.
Let the agent's prior probability for the model ro be denoted by aro0 > 0, where L. awo = 1. Define P (},,< x t I .94 -t>a(J) .t -1
:Ll ro'( X t I .94-l) a w',t-1
The quantity (3) is the agent's posterior probability for model ro given the data Xt. X2 . .. . , Xt. The agent's probability for event E1 given all information available prior to time t is then given by:
Adopt for the moment the position of an agent who believes that one of the models is correct, although she does not know which one. Call this unknown correct model Pro*· The following lemma shows that the agent believes that the mixture distribution will eventually arrive at probabilities which agree with those of the unknown correct model Pro*· Lemma 1: With probability 1 under the distribution Pro*. the posterior probability a001 of model Pro converges to a limiting value a00 as t � oo . If the limiting posterior probability is greater than zero, then
Corollary 2: With probability 1 under Pro•. P(Xt 194-t) -Pro>�<(Xt I 94-t) � 0 as t � oo.
Corollary 2 states that if the data are produced by some unknown "true" probability distribution, then Bayesian updating of a mixture distribution which assigns nonzero probability to the correct model will eventually result in forecasts agreeing with the true probabilities. 2
2 SEARCH AND REVISION -NO FORGETTING
Suppose that (4) describes the agent's beliefs about the X t.
In other words, the agent's beliefs can be represented as a mixture over the models Pro. However, the agent cannot compute the full mixture distribution, and thus the agent does not "know" her larger-world beliefs at any point in time.
In this section, I analyze the behavior of a heuristic model search and revision process, referred to as SR. Informally, the SR process can be described as follows. At each time period, the agent makes a prediction given her current model (one of the Pro). and at the same time (i.e., based on the same information) selects an alternate model according to a model search distribution. She then compares the relative posterior probabilities of the current and alternate models. If the posterior probability of her current model is higher than that of the alternate model, she retains the current model; otherwise, she replaces it with the alternate model. means that the probability of selecting model ro depends only on 91'i:-1· that is, on infonnation known to the agent prior to time t.) For each t > 0, COat is assumed to be selected independently of X 1 according to the probability
that the agent updates her model by selecting for the next period's current model the model with the higher posterior probability given all information observed so far. That is, suppose that A-rot denotes the likelihood of the observed data under the model indexed by ro (an explicit fonnula is given as Equation (A-1) in the appendix below). Then the agent selects her current model at time t according to:
2Proofs are given in the Appendix. The proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 carry through for countable n as well. Corollary 4: Under the mixture distribution, the probability that I P00 (X1 I !J4_1)-P(X t I J4_1) I> e ( 9 ) ct converges to zero for each e > 0.
Corollary 4 states that under the mixture distribution, the difference between the forecast of roct and the forecast of the mixture distribution converges in probability to zero. This means that the probability that this difference exceeds in absolute value any fixed nonzero constant becomes arbitrarily small as t approaches infmity. In other words, with more observations it becomes increasingly probable that the curr ent model's forecast will be very close to the mixture model's forecast
The SR procedure is intended to model an agent restricted in her ability to represent and compute her entire mixture distribution. But it is deficient in one important respect as a plausible model for a bounded agent. Each time the agent enumerates a new model she must compute the likelihood of the entire sequence of previously observed data under the new model. This means that the agent must not only remember the entire past sequence of data 3 The term paradigm shift is usually resetved for major belief shifts, typified by the replacement of Newton's theory by the theory of relativity. The formal framework presented here applies whether Ol indexes grand theories of the universe or simple time series models of stock market prices. Although one might balk at using the tenn paradigm shift in the latter context, it is interesting to note that the same formal framework applies to belief changes at a variety of levels. The SR procedure is feasible as a model of information exchange among rational agents. For suppose that the set n indexes a large population of different agents. Each agent w has his own model Pro. After each trial, each agent computes his own model's likelihood /.001 for the data. (This is simply the product of A.w,t-1 and the probability forecast for the event which actually occurred at period t.) The SR agent begins by selecting one of the agents Wet as an advisor. On each trial, she interviews an alternate advisor roat• and replaces her current advisor if she believes it is more probable that the interviewee will provide correct predictions than that the current advisor will. Theorem 1 says that such a sequential selection process will yield asymptotically correct forecasts if one of the agent's models is asymptotically correct and each agent is interviewed infinitely often.
SR possesses the important property that it will eventually track correctly any process which one of the models in the search space can track. This is true assuming only that each model is visited infinitely often.
In particular, the probability that the correct model w* is visited on any trial can be very small, and can even decrease with t (as long as it does not decrease so rapidly that ro • is not visited infinitely often).
But real forecasters cannot wait until infinity. Of more importance to them is the shorter-term performance of SR. This will depend on the properties of the model enumeration process llt• of which I have said nothing but that it visits each model infinitely often. For good short term forecasts, the forecaster requires good diagnostics for suggesting new models to enumerate based on performance of the current model (cf., Laskey, 1991) .
RELAXING THE MEMORY
REQUIREMENT
Usually when entertaining a new theory one does not have available all the data which went into the computation of the current theory's likelihood function. If one moves from the population of forecasters interpretation to one in which a single forecaster enumerates models sequentially, the memory requirement of Section 3.2 becomes untenable. This section considers relaxation of the memory assumption.
To do this, I define a search strategy which can be followed by a memory limited agent. This strategy will be called SRF (for search and revise with forgetting) . SRF works like SR in that the agent makes predictions on the basis of a current model while searching a space of alternate models. Again, the current model and the alternate model are compared on the basis of relative posterior probabilities, and the more probable model is retained. The differences between SRF and SR are:
Posterior probabilities are computed on the basis of data observed after the alternate model has been enumerated; and Alternate models are retained for an observation period while performance statistics are being collected (unlike SR, in which a new alternate model was generated each time period).
The agent applying SRF need only remember the information required to compare the current model and the alternate model; information necessary to evaluate other models will be required only when those models are enumerated.
If the agent is permitted to forget data, additional conditions are needed to determine the asymptotic behavior of SRF under the mixture distribution. Specifically, we need to know that the nature of the process is not changing with time: that the models which fit well now are likely to be the ones which fit well in the past. If this condition is not met, then SRF will be too likely (relative to SR) to accept models which fit poorly in the past but now fit well. This could cause SRF to be fooled into dropping the correct model in favor of one that temporarily predicts well, but will begin predicting poo rly at some future time. 4 I now specialize to a particular structure for the distribution of the Xt. Let Bit, ... , Bqt be a set of random variables observed by the agent before she observes Xt. and A 1 t. ... , Art a set of random variables observed by the agent after she observes Xt. The B k t and A k t are assumed to have only finitely many possible values. Suppose that under each P(J). the random vectors Pw would include both a model structure and a procedure for estimating model probabilities given past data.
The SRF strategy compares models over a trial period of length k. The agent begins the nth trial period with a current model W en and an alternate model Wa n (the initial 4If the environment is changing slowly, the correct model is not in the search space, n contains models which predict well in the short term, and the search process is likely to find a good short-term predictor when the current one begins to fail, then SRF may perform better than SR. Analyzing the non-stationary case would be an interesting extension to the present paper. 5The sequence S1, S2, ... is said to be exchangeable if the� have the same joint probability distribution when arbitrarily reordered.
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values Wet and Wal m� be chosen arbitrarily). She observes data over the n trial period, which consist of the variables Snk-k+l • ... , Snk. The agent then computes the likelihood under each of the two models of the data observed during the nth trial period:
:A.wn = P (J)(Xnk-k+l I .?I().Bnk-k+l)
· P(J)(Xnk-k+2 I .?I(). Snk-k+l·Bnk-k+2) ... Pro(Xnk 1.9fo,Sn-k+l• .. ·• S nk-l· Bnk)
for w = men• Wa n . At the end of the nth trial period, the agent selects the current and alternate models for the n + 1 s t trial period. The current model is replaced by the alternate model if the product of its nth period likelihood and its prior probability is higher than that of the current model:
The next alternate model Wa ,n+ 1 is selected according to a probability distribution J.L ( W I Qn), where Qn represents all the information available to the agent during the nth trial period:
While the agent compares models based only on data collected since the alternate model was enumerated,6 the agent's forecast is based on all data observed since the curre nt model was enumerated:
where We n was ftrst enumerated as the alternate model on trial m of the model selection process, was adopted after the observation period, and has been the current model since.
If the St are independent and identically distributed, then the random sequence � is a Markov chain with fixed transition probabilities. If J.l(W l On) is positive for all w and none of the Pro assigns zero probabilities, then any state can be reached from any other state. Under these conditions, the chain possesses a stationary distribution (see, e.g., Billingsley, 1979) . That is, if the process is permitted to evolve for a long period of time, the frequency with which it occupies state q approaches a limiting probability 1tq. Thus, the SRF process does not converge to the correct probabilities. From any state (including states in which the current model has high 6Restricting the agent to current period data greatly simplifies the mathematics. Again, no claim is made to optimality or fidelity to how real agents reason.
7The assumption I made was that the St were exchangeable. This means they have the same distribution as an independent and identically distributed sequence with unknown probability distribution.
Under exchangeability, Qn has the same distribution as a Markov chain with unknown transition probabilities. Thus, distributional results for Markov chains apply.
Laskey posterior probability relative to the other models) it is possible to reach any other state (including states in which the curr ent model has very low posterior probability).
At equilibrium, transitions out of a state must balance transitions into the state. Let C denote the set of states for which the limiting JX>Sterior probability is greater than zero (these must all be asymptotically correc t models), and D denote the set of states for which the limiting posterior probability is equal to zero (if there are any asymptotically incorrect models, D must be nonempty by Lemma 1).
Let Ps t denote the probability of transition from state s to state t. Then 
Increasing the length k of the trial period decreases the spread of the posterior probabilities about their limiting values. This decreases the probability of transition out of C and increases the probability of transition out of D.
The effect of this is to increase the equilibrium probabilities of states in C. But increasing the sample size also increases the amount of time the system stays with each model, and therefore slows down the time it takes to move away from an initial poor-fitting model.
This suggests the possibility of beginning SRF with a short trial period and gradually increasing the trial period as time goes on.8
In summary, the SRF model was analyzed on a restricted class of problems--those in which the probability of Et could be modeled as a time-invariant but unknown function of a finite set of auxiliary variables with finite sample spaces. It was shown that SRF with a fixed trial period does not converge to mixture model probabilities under the mixture model, but that increasing the length of the trial period decreases the probability of states in which the current model probabilities are far from the mixture probabilities.
. INCORRECT MODELS
The foregoing discussion assumed that the mixture model was adequate. That is, the agent's larger world probabilities are the same as a model in which there is an unknown correct model in the agent's search space, and the agent believes that the mixture model probabilities will eventually match empirical frequencies arbitrarily closely.
This section considers what can be said about the search processes defmed above when the agent takes seriously the proposition that none of the models is asymptotically correct
The behavior of a mixture distribution when none of the models is correct depends on the limiting behavior of the model likelihoods under the correct distribution. If Tit(X LJ 8It should be possible to prove that a suitably chosen schedule for lengthening the trial period implies convergence in probability, but that is a matter for another paper.
is the actual probability of Xt. then it may be reasonable to assume that a version of the law of large numbers holds, and that under II, UT = � i log P 00(X1 I !/4) (16) i=l approaches a limit as T � oo. This will occur, for example, in the exchangeable variables model assumed in Section 3.3 (assuming that none of the models assigns zero probabilities).
The average log-likelihood UT is a quantity often used to evaluate probability forecasts. Suppose a forecaster assesses probabilities over a set of events, and when the observation is made receives a score log(p), where p is the probability assigned to the event that actually occurred.
The value Ut is the agent's average score under this logarithmic scoring rule. The logarithmic scoring rule is an example of a proper scoring rule: that is, the expected score is maximized by assigning the correct probability distribution.
Note that if two models have equal prior probabilities, SR selects the model for which the past logarithmic score is highest. As T approaches infinity, the effect of the prior wears off; in the limit, SR settles on the model with the highest logarithmic score. A future paper will consider the performance of SR under different scoring rules, and considers a modified SR that converges to the model whose asymptotic score is highest under scoring rules other than logarithmic.
A APPENDIX: PROOFS OF RESULTS
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 do not depend on finiteness of n. Because the martingale (5) is always nonnegative, the martingale convergence theorem applies (cf., Billingsley, 1979) . Therefore, there exists a limiting random variable R(ro,ro*) such that R1(ro,ro*) � R(ro,ro*) with probability 1 under Pro•·
The random variable
is also a nonnegative martingale, and therefore also converges to a limiting variable R(ro*). Note that Rt(ro*) � a00•oR t(ro* ,ro*) :;::; aro•o. so that Rt(ro*) is bounded away from zero. The posterior probability of model ro is given by
Cl rot = aro0R1(ro,ro*)
R1(ro*) (A-3)
This ratio converges to a limit a00 equal to the quotient of the limits of numerator and denominator. From (A-1) it is clear that Rt( ro,ro*) converges to a nonzero limit, and therefore that nro > 0, only if (5) holds. converges to zero, which implies that the sum converges to zero.
Proof of Theorem 3: The proof of Lemma 1 established that Clro t � a00 with probability 1. Select the index ro1 so that aro1 � aro for all roe .n.
Note that if all Clro are equal to aro1 then (5) holds for all ro (by Lemma 1) and the theorem holds. Therefore, we need only consider the case in which some a00 is strictly less than aro1• Select ffi2 as index of the next largest a00 not equal to the first: a00 2 = max ( a00 : roe .n and a00 * ar o1).
Let q�(aro 1 -Clro2). For each ro there is an index T ro such that I a001 -a00 I < q if t > T 00• Let T = max {T 00) • Then for t > T, I llrot -a00 I < q for all ro e .n. This implies that
Clrol t -Clrot > Clro l -Cl ro -2q > Clro2 -Clro .
This latter quantity is nonnegative unless a00 = a001• Thus, once an ro for which Cl ro = aro 1 is visited on a trial greater than T, it will remain the case that Clro = a00 on all future trials. That is, IDct will remain at ro c1 for which the limiting posterior probability is strictly positive. These are values for which (5) holds. Hence, (8) holds.
The foregoing argument is valid for each realization for which the Clrot all converge, and Lemma 1 established that such realizations occur with probability 1 under Pro•.
Proof of Corollary 4: Suppose the agent believes that the Xt actually arise from one of the distributions Pro*· By Theorem 3, the agent believes that (8) holds, which implies that I ProctCXt l1fi_l) -Pro•(Xt l.'}{t-1) I� 0 with probability 1. By Theorem 2, I P(X1 l.?ft-I) -Pro•(Xt I .?it-t) I � 0 with probability 1. Therefore, I Pro (Xt I 14-c• The Bounded Bayesian 165 I) -P(X1 I .?fr-1) I � 0, with probability 1. But probability 1 convergence implies convergence in distribution, which is (9). But if (9) holds for any process distributed according to the mixture distribution P, it holds for all such distributions.
